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Abstract 
 
Using historical firm financial and insider trading information, this paper examines 
whether high-level insiders manipulate earnings ahead of their own 10b5-1 equity 
transactions. The empirical evidence suggests that high-level executives appear to 
manipulate earnings through real activities such as abnormal discretionary expenditures 
and abnormal cash flows from operations to influence equity prices ahead of their own 
transactions under Rule 10b5-1. Evidence also suggests that executives appear to be 
unlikely to engage in earnings management through highly scrutinized means such as 
accruals. An interpretation of these results is that high-level executives may be using 
10b5-1 plans as an offensive tool to trade with the knowledge of inside information, 
which appears to be in direct opposition to the defensive mechanism that 10b5-1 plans 
are intended to represent. 
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I. Introduction 
 Insider trading and information-advantageous trades have long been a concern of 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC details explicit 
restrictions for trading securities on a U.S. regulated exchange.1 Rule 10b-5 prohibits 
deceit or fraud in the course of a security purchase or sale. A company executive in 
possession of non-public information, who made a sale of relevant securities, would thus 
be in violation of insider trading restrictions. Hence, a company insider would typically 
not be able to trade this equity due to the possession of material nonpublic information.2 
In order to regulate insider trading on the basis of this material nonpublic information, the 
SEC adopted provision 10b5-1.3 A 10b5-1 plan is a method for company executives, 
officers, managers, large shareholders, or other insiders to trade equity in that company 
without violating insider trading restrictions.4 Rule 10b5-1 was created as a safe haven 
against said restrictions. 
 This rule allows an insider to sell shares as long as a certain condition is met. 
Specifically, the seller of equity must either specify the amount, price, and specific date 
of purchase or sale; or include a formula for determining a specific amount, price, and 
date of purchase or sale or give a broker the sole authority to determine if, when, and how 
trades are executed and said broker may not be in the possession of any material 
                                                
1 See Code of Federal Regulations Title 17 § 240.10b-5 
2 Title 17 Part 240 of the CFR has banned insider trading on the basis of material 
nonpublic information 
3 See Code of Federal Regulations Title 17 § 240.10b5-1 
4 Rule 10b-5 and the establishment of 10b5-1 trading plans can be found in the Code of 
Federal Regulations Title 17 § 240.10b-5 
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nonpublic information.5 This makes implementing a 10b5-1 plan a rather simple strategy 
for someone with the economic resources to do so. These conditions are not restrictive, 
and clearly leave ambiguity as to the scope of trade execution. Arguably, these limited 
restrictions and regulations of such plans put participants more on the offensive than the 
defensive, contrary to the intention of this rule. The Director of Enforcement for the SEC 
has previously stated that recent academic research shows potential abuse of Rule 10b5-
1. She also claims that the possibility has been raised that Rule 10b5-1 plans are being 
used to facilitate insider trading on the basis of nonpublic information.6 
 Prior research strongly suggests that company managers appear to have no 
problem using questionable strategies to give themselves and their employees an 
advantage. In particular, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) manage the timing of voluntary disclosures and news around the timing of option 
awards in order to maximize potential profit. This same tendency is found by Daines et 
al. (2014) in an analysis of pre-option grant behavior by lead executives. CEOs are shown 
to have the tendency to release or create bad news pre-grant and delay the timing of 
positive news until after award grants. 
 This asymmetric information-advantageous behavior is not only limited to option 
awards. Similar phenomena are observed in equity markets. Specifically, Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) use data that predates the implementation of Rule 10b5-1 to show that 
insider purchases are related to future earnings performance, market-to-book ratios, and 
                                                
5 See Code of Federal Regulations Title 17 § 240.10b-5 
6 Speech by the SEC staff, Remarks at the 2007 Corporate Council Institute by Linda 
Chatman Thomsen Director, Division of Enforcement U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission Washington, D.C. March 8, 2007 
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past returns. They infer that insiders are thus trading on the basis of private financial 
account knowledge. Additionally, Jiang and Zaman (2007) find that insider trades are 
predominately due to strategic managerial timing. Furthermore, Beneish et al. (2004) 
examine data from 1983-1997, which predates Rule 10b5-1, and find evidence that 
managers scale earnings upwards after sales to reduce potential litigation risks.  
Jagolinzer (2008) analyzes insider trading data and finds participants in 10b5-1 
plans who sell equity generate abnormal trade returns, permitting strategic trades to 
occur. However, Jagolinzer (2008) does not answer the question of how these abnormal 
trade returns are generated. Robbins (2008) suggests that insiders use 10b5-1 plans to 
effectively trade on insider information by establishing plans to sell and then cancelling 
them if they become aware of material nonpublic positive news. This strategy is allowed 
to prevail because cancelling a 10b5-1 plan is not a violation of insider trading laws due 
to the fact that a trade must execute for insider trading to have occurred.7 Additionally, 
Robbins (2008) finds that insiders strategically announce 10b5-1 plan trades in order to 
further profit from equity market adjustments. In line with these findings, Henderson et 
al. (2012) find that insiders voluntarily disclose 10b5-1 plan information to increase their 
strategic trade returns. 
 Following these findings, Shon and Veliotis (2013) determine how insiders are 
able to generate above average abnormal trade returns for 10b5-1 plan trade executions. 
Building on Jagolinzer (2008), Shon and Veliotis (2013) determine that insiders are able 
                                                
7 The SEC and Supreme Court has clarified this at Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and 
Insider Trading. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. 17 CFR Parts 240, 
243, and 249. Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, File No. S7-31-99. RIN 3235-
AH82. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading 
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to achieve abnormal above average trade returns by meeting or beating analysts’ earnings 
expectations. Shon and Veliotis (2013) briefly mention that they control for accruals and 
that the respective control variable is significant in each regression. Shon and Veliotis 
(2013) note that this suggests accruals play a role in the likelihood of meeting or beating 
expectations. Skaife et al. (2012) also investigate the significance of financial accounts on 
insider trading. Skaife et al. (2012) find that firms reporting ineffective internal control 
over financial reporting experience more profitable insider trades. This suggests that 
financial reporting and financial accounts deserve more scrutiny when it comes to the 
investigation of abnormal insider trade profits. 
 It follows that company executives with 10b5-1 plans in place could control 
potential profits on equity moves by accrual manipulation or with further discretionary 
earnings management. The purpose of this study is to expand on prior research and to 
determine how participants in 10b5-1 plans generate above average returns, specifically 
at the executive level. Prior research that suggests accruals may play a role in earnings 
management ahead of 10b5-1 transactions. I examine this suggestion as well as analyzing 
further methods of earnings management that may typically be less obvious than accrual 
management. I posit that managers may be inclined to manipulate accounts that are less 
scrutinized than accruals. I analyze 10b5-1 plan sales and purchases juxtaposed with 
corresponding accrual management and discretionary earnings management to determine 
the cause of abnormally large trade returns under the 10b5-1 program. In particular, I 
compare 10b5-1 sell or purchase transactions with previous quarter performance matched 
accruals, abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenditures, and 
abnormal productions. These aspects of a firm’s financial statements have not been 
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previously analyzed as the underlying causes of excess 10b5-1 plan trade returns, and I 
posit that they are the main cause of said phenomena. Furthermore, I expand on prior 
research by analyzing whether impending 10b5-1 plan transactions cause firms to barely 
beat analysts’ earnings expectations in the quarters preceding these transactions while 
subsequently determining the driving forces behind these microscopic earnings surprises. 
Note that equity transactions taking place in one quarter (t) are able to influence earnings 
management actions in the previous quarter (t-1) due to the fact that the transaction were 
in place and analyzed during multiple previous quarters (t-2, t-3, t-4, etc…). For example, 
if a 10b5-1 transaction is planned for Q4 of 2012, then this transaction will be known 
about by the insider and any portfolio managers in Q1, Q2, and Q3 of 2012, and likely 
parts of fiscal 2011, as well. This knowledge during the quarters preceding the trade 
allows an insider to manipulate financial accounts in the quarter directly preceding the 
10b5-1 plan equity transaction. 
 I find suggestive evidence that the occurrence of a 10b5-1 plan transaction results 
in the presence of abnormal earnings management in the prior fiscal quarter to the 
transaction. Specifically, I find that high-level insiders appear to strategically manipulate 
abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal cash flows from operations ahead of 
their own 10b5-1 purchases or sales. Additionally, I find that the occurrence of a 10b5-1 
plan transaction appears to strongly influences a firm’s likelihood of having a small 
earnings surprise, and that this likelihood of surprise is driven by the 10b5-1 transaction 
and the subsequent earnings management that arises. These results suggest that 10b5-1 
plans may be used as an offensive strategy by high-level executives in order to reap 
abnormally high trade profits, contrary to the legal intentions of Rule 10b5-1.  
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 In the following section, I discuss the data. In Section III, I present the empirical 
strategy and results. Section IV provides conclusion. 
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II. Data 
 I use data from Thomson Reuters, CRSP, Compustat, and I/B/E/S to create a 
unique data set of 10b5-1 transactions combined with historical financial data for 4,837 
U.S. publicly traded companies between 2008 and 2013. Specifically, the data for 10b5-1 
plan transactions is obtained from Thomson Reuters and is comprised of only equity 
transactions disclosed on SEC Form 3, 4, 5, or 144. All transactions occur at the CEO or 
CFO level. Table 1 lists definitions for all relevant variables. 
 There are 53,809 firm-quarter observations for historical firm data, during which 
3,358 firm quarters had equity purchases occur, 9,710 firm quarters had equity sales 
occur, and 40,741 firm quarters had no equity purchases or equity sales occur. As in prior 
research (Shon and Veliotis (2013)) 258 periods that contain both equity purchases and 
equity sales are dropped from the final data. Instances where C-suite executives make 
both equity purchases and sales of the same equity in the same firm quarter are dropped 
because the directional sign of earnings management in regression analysis is irrelevant if 
both purchases and sales occur at the same level. These occurrences make up less than 
0.5% of the data. I create a binary variable called Dummysales, which is equal to 1 if 
there is a 10b5-1 sale by a C-suite executive in the given quarter, and is equal to 0 if a 
10b5-1 sale does not occur. I also create a binary variable called Dummypurchases, 
which is equal to 1 if there is a 10b5-1 purchase by a C-suite executive in the given 
quarter, and is equal to 0 if a 10b5-1 purchase does not occur. Note that Dummysales and 
Dummypurchases cannot both equal 1 in the same quarter, these occurrences have been 
dropped, as previously stated. Dummysales and Dummypurchases can both equal 0 in the 
same period. This would indicate that no 10b5-1 transaction (sale or purchase) took 
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place. Table 2 shows relevant 10b5-1 information and summary statistics. There are 2.9 
times as many observations for equity sales as compared to equity purchases by insiders 
under 10b5-1 transactions. Occurrences of insider sales are more prevalent than 
purchases because an insider is more likely to sell equity in their firm to diversify, as 
opposed to purchasing more equity in their own firm to further concentrate a position. 
The average value of firm equity purchases in a given quarter is 0.074% of the firm’s 
market capitalization, while the average value of equity sales per firm in a given quarter 
is 0.18%. A one standard deviation change in the level of firm purchases is equal to 
0.18% of firm market capitalization while a one standard deviation change in the level of 
firm sales is equal to 0.31% of firm market capitalization. The largest equity purchase is 
1.21% of market capitalization, the largest equity sale was 1.97% of market 
capitalization, while the smallest transactions for both sides of the trade were negligible 
and close to 0% of market capitalization. Note that all variables obtained are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.8  
 Historical financial data from quarterly filings is obtained from Compustat and 
CRSP mergers. Instances of duplicate or missing information based on a unique firm 
level identifier that is cross-referenced with 10b5-1 plan data are dropped from the data 
set. Quarterly financial data is used to determine performance matched abnormal accruals 
and discretionary earnings management, as well as for determining firm and industry 
specific control variables. Firm historical financial data variables are defined as follows. 
Refer to Table 1 for definitions of all variables mentioned. Earnings surprise is measured 
                                                
8 This action converts outliers below the 1st percentile to the 1st percentile and outliers 
above the 99th percentile to the 99th percentile.8 This controls for extreme deviations in 
the data.  
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as the difference between the firm’s actual earnings and the mean of analysts’ 
expectations, divided by the equity price per share (controlling for firm size). I create a 
binary variable for a small surprise that equals 1 if a firm’s quarterly earnings per share 
reporting beat analyst expectations by greater than 0.0 cents but less than 0.5 cents and 0 
otherwise. I also consider two alternative small surprise indicators variables to ensure my 
results are not driven by how this variable is defined. The first equals 1 if a firm’s 
quarterly earnings per share reporting beat analyst expectations by greater than 0.5 cents 
but less than 1.0 cents and 0 otherwise while the second equals 1 if a firm’s quarterly 
earnings per share reporting beat analyst expectations by greater than 1.0 cents but less 
than 1.5 cents and 0 otherwise.  
I also consider these additional historical firm financial data variables: the log of 
the market capitalization of the firm, the debt to asset ratio of the firm, the excess return 
of the firm which is measured as the compounded three month return percentage over the 
S&P500 index for each firm, the share turnover which is measured as the volume of 
shares exchanged in an aggregate over the firms total outstanding float, and market to 
book which is measured as the ratio of the firm’s total market capitalization divided by 
the firm’s total book value. Measures of discretionary earnings management consist of 
abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenditures, abnormal 
production levels, and abnormal performance matched accruals. Firm industry is 
controlled for at the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. The two-
digit SIC code identifies firms based on their major group type, as defined by the Federal 
Government. 
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 Additionally, coinciding with historical firm performance financial information, 
relevant historical analyst expectations at the firm level are collected from I/B/E/S and 
include a measure of the mean level of analyst expectations for a firm’s earnings per 
share. Summary statistics for relevant firm historical financial information is presented in 
Table 2. Historical data representing overall U.S. stock performance and volatility, 
monthly Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P500) and monthly Volatility S&P500 (VIX) values, 
are obtained from CRSP and the Chicago Board of Options Exchange historical data. In 
the analysis, I control for the level of the VIX index, as well as the month over month 
return of the S&P500 index.  Summary statistics for both of these indices are presented in 
Table 2. It can be seen that the S&P500 has increased linearly over the five-year 
observation period, with small downwards corrections in mid 2010 and mid 2011. The 
VIX index reached a period low of 13.45 and a high level of 44.14. The size of a one 
standard deviation move in the VIX index is equal to 8.96 and the average level is 23.84. 
I present correlations and pairwise correlations for all variables in Table 3 and Table 4, 
respectively. Correlations between measures of earnings management and measures of 
small earnings surprises are all statistically significant at or below the 5% level. The same 
holds true for the relationship between the occurrence of a 10b5-1 transaction and 
measures of earnings management. Further analysis will determine if these relationships 
hold true when controls are included in the regression models. 
 Accrual management is calculated by estimating abnormal accruals pursuant to 
the modified Jones model (1991). Firms are separated by industry at the 2-digit SIC code. 
If an industry has less than 10 observations for any given time period, it is dropped from 
the upcoming regression model. The modified Jones model (1991) is used to estimate 
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abnormal discretionary accruals from industry level accruals and controls for the level of 
inverse firm assets, property plant and equipment (PPE), and change in sales. After 
estimating abnormal accruals through the Jones mode (1991), abnormal accruals are 
adjusted pursuant to the model developed by Kothari et al. (2005). This model calculates 
performance-matched abnormal accruals by controlling for return on assets (ROA) in the 
abnormal accrual estimation regression model. This strategy is implemented to control 
for the effect of firm specific performance, measured by ROA, on discretionary accruals. 
Specifically, the performance-matched accrual calculation subtracts the abnormal jones 
model accruals of the firm in the quarter with the closest -matched ROA. 
 The remaining relevant measures of earnings management are abnormal cash 
flows from operations, abnormal production, and abnormal discretionary expenditures. 
Abnormal denotes variable deviations from the industry average. Cash flows from 
operations represent CFOs as per firm financial statements. Discretionary expenditures 
are the sum of advertising, research and development, and selling, general, and 
administrative expenses. Abnormal production is the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) 
and changes in inventory during the quarter. Note that measures of abnormal earnings 
management are scaled by the level of total firm assets. These variables are estimated 
according to the Roychowdhury model (2006). Roychowdhury (2006) finds that in 
additional to abnormal accruals, managers also manipulate earnings through real 
activities. He asserts that managers have a tendency to manipulate cash flows from 
operations upwards to produce better net income numbers, to overproduce in order to 
reduce COGS to report higher margins, or to lower discretionary expenditures in order to 
report improved net income numbers.  
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 In order to determine abnormal measures of earnings management, I follow 
Roychowdhury (2006) and estimate the subsequent model: 
 𝑦! =   𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑋! +   𝜀!                                                                                  (1) 
where y is a measure of firm level financials (cash flows from operations, production 
levels, or discretionary expenditures), X is a vector of control variables that capture the 
tendency to engage in the manipulation of cash flows from operations, production levels, 
or discretionary expenditures (the inverse of assets, property plan and equipment (PPE) 
or sales over assets, and the change in sales over assets), t indicates time, and ε is an error 
term with the usual properties. For variable definitions please see Table 1. By controlling 
for the firm level at the two-digit SIC code in this regression, I am able to predict the 
regression model errors, thus generating the industry level measure of abnormal cash 
flows from operations, abnormal production levels, abnormal discretionary expenditures, 
and abnormal performance matched accruals. These measures of earnings management 
are all scaled by percentage of firm total asset level.  
Table 7 presents the mean level of earnings management by 10b5-1 sales and 
purchases in the following quarter, respectively. As predicted, I find numerous 
statistically significant relationships between 10b5-1 sales (purchases) and measures of 
earnings management.  The remainder of the paper formally analyzes these relationships 
between high-level executive 10b5-1 transactions and earnings manipulation.  
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III. Empirical Strategy and Results 
As previously stated, the purpose of this analysis is to determine if insiders who 
participate in 10b5-1 Plan transactions manipulate earnings in the quarter prior to the 
transaction being executed. I posit that insiders manage earnings through accrual 
management, cash flow from operations management, production management, or 
discretionary expenditure management. Additionally, I posit that high level executive 
10b5-1 plan transactions lead to a greater likelihood of a firm experiencing a small 
earning’s surprise (in relation to analyst estimates) and that this surprise is likely driven 
through active earnings manipulation. In order to test this, I estimate a model of the 
following form:  
 𝑦!!! =   𝛼 +   𝛽!𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠! +   𝛽!𝑋!!! + 𝜁!   +     𝜀!                                                   (2) 
where y is a measure of earnings management (abnormal performance matched accruals, 
abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production, or abnormal discretionary 
expenditures), DummyTrans is an indicator variable equal to 1 if there is a 10b5-1 sale 
(purchase) by a C-suite executive in the given quarter, and is equal to 0 otherwise 
(depending on the specification), X is a vector of control variables that capture the 
tendency to implement a 10b5-1 Plan transaction or the tendency to engage in the 
manipulation of earnings (S&P 500 volatility index level, month over month return of the 
S&P500, the log of firm market capitalization, debt to asset ratio, the excess return of 
firm equity, market to book ratio, and two digit industry classification), zeta controls for 
time fixed effects, t indicates quarter, and ε is an error term with the usual properties. In 
all regressions, I cluster the standard errors at the firm level. 
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 Additionally, this paper also seeks to determine whether the occurrence of an 
executive level 10b5-1 plan transaction affects the probability of a small firm level 
earnings surprise. While Shon and Veliotis (2013) test whether 10b5-1 plan transactions 
affect a firm’s likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations (MBE), they do not 
incorporate any measure of earnings management into the model. I test whether or not 
10b5-1 plan transactions and respective earnings management lead to an incredibly small 
earnings surprise, barely passing analyst estimates, at either the 0.5 cent, 1 cent, or 1.5 
cent levels. Specifically, I estimate a probit model of the following form: 𝑦!!! =   𝛼 +   𝛽!𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒!!!+  𝛽!𝑋!!!+  𝛽!𝑅!   + 𝜁! +   𝜀!              (3)  
where y is a binary measure of the occurrence of a small earnings surprise (depending on 
the specification this is either 1, 2, or 3), DummyTrans is as previously defined, Manage 
is a variable indicating the level of earnings management (abnormal discretionary 
expenditures, abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production, or abnormal 
performance matched accruals), R is an interaction variable between earnings 
management and the indicator variable for whether there is a 10b5-1 sale (purchase) by a 
C-suite executive in the given quarter, and all other variables are as previously defined.  
For this analysis, I present marginal effects and standard errors calculated using the delta 
method. 
Table 5 presents the results from equation 2 (Table 5 Panels A, B, C, & D) where 
measures of earnings manipulation are juxtaposed with subsequent occurrences of 10b5-1 
transactions.  Moreover, within each individual panel, Column (1) controls for 10b5-1 
plan purchases in a given quarter and Column (2) controls 10b-1 plan sales in a given 
quarter. Table 6 presents the results from equation 3 (Table 6 Panels H, J, K, & L) where 
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the occurrences of small earnings surprises are juxtaposed with occurrences of earnings 
manipulation and subsequent 10b5-1 plan transactions. As before, the execution of a sale 
versus a purchase is controlled for individually. The results in both equation 2 and 
equation 3 for the analysis of abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal cash 
flows from operations are as expected (although the latter is contrary to Roychowdhury) 
while the results for abnormal performance matched accruals are opposite of expectation, 
likely due to the fact that executives to not want to manipulate a highly scrutinized 
measure, such as accruals, before their own transactions. In the case of abnormal 
production, the results are highly contrary to expectation; potentially due to the fact that 
Roychowdhury’s model does not accurately capture how abnormal production can be 
used to manipulate earnings. All other control variables give the expected result, with the 
exception of the Volatility S&P 500 level and the S&P500 monthly return, which are 
statistically insignificant. These additional control variable results hold true across all 
equations. 
The results from equation 2 (Table 5 Panel A) and equation 3 (Table 6 Panels H1-
H3) analyzing the effect of 10b5-1 sales and purchases on the manipulation of abnormal 
discretionary expenditures and the effect of said manipulation on the likelihood of a small 
earnings surprise occurring are as expected. In the analysis of abnormal discretionary 
expenditures, the equation 2 coefficient on dummysales is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on dummypurchases is positive, but 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that the occurrence of a 10b5-1 sale reduces 
abnormal discretionary expenditures by 0.17% of firm assets in the preceding quarter. 
Although no statistically significant relationship is evident ahead of equity purchases, 
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these results indicate that managers significantly reduce discretionary expenditures ahead 
of their own timed equity sales. The results from equation 2 are supported further by the 
results in equation 3. In the case of smallearningssurprise1 (an earnings surprise between 
0 and 0.5 cents) the coefficients on both abnormal discretionary expenditures and 
dummysales are significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on dummysales is positive 
and the coefficient on abnormal discretionary expenditures is negative. This indicates that 
a 10b5-1 sale increases the likelihood of a small earnings beat occurring in the preceding 
quarter by 10.6%. Additionally, a 0.5% lower level of abnormal discretionary 
expenditures in terms of total firm assets increases the likelihood of preceding quarter 
earnings surprise occurring by 17.7% in the case of an equity sale. The results from 
equation 2 indicate that this downward manipulation of abnormal discretionary 
expenditures is indeed likely to occur ahead of high-level executive 10b5-1 sales. The 
reverse case holds true in the presence of an impending 10b5-1 purchase. In this case, the 
coefficients on abnormal discretionary expenditures and dummypurchases are both 
negative and statistically significant, at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. This indicates 
that in the event of a 10b5-1 purchase the firm is 5.8% less likely to experience a 
previous quarter small earnings surprise. Furthermore, a 0.5% increase in the level of 
abnormal discretionary expenditures decreases the likelihood of a small earnings surprise 
by 13.8%. The results from equation 2 indicate that this manipulation is likely to occur. 
In the case of smallearningssurprise2 and smallearningssurprise3 (earnings beats 
between 0.5-1.0 cent and 1.0-1.5 cents) abnormal discretionary expenditures do not play 
a statistically significant role in the likelihood of an earnings surprise. The occurrence of 
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a 10b5-1 transaction remains statistically significant for purchases and sales at the 1% 
level at all levels of tested earnings surprises. 
The results from equation 2 (Table 5 Panel B) and equation 3 (Table 6 Panels J1-
J3) are also as expected in the case of abnormal cash flows from operations. The equation 
2 coefficient for dummysales is both positive and statistically significant below the 1% 
level, suggesting that in the quarter preceding a 10b5-1 plan equity sale, executive level 
management manipulates abnormal cash flows from operations upwards in advance of 
said sale by 0.42% of firm assets. The opposite case occurs when executives have a 10b5-
1 plan in place to purchase equity. The coefficient on dummypurchases is both negative 
and statistically significant below the 1% level, suggesting that executives manipulate 
abnormal cash flows from operations downwards preceding an equity purchase in amount 
of 0.33% of firm asset level. The signs on both of these variables are opposite of what 
Roychowdhury (2006) initially predicts, but not inherently incorrect. Roychowdhury 
asserts that lower cash flows from operations are actually what help improve a firm’s 
bottom line because lower cash flows from operations result from sales management. 
Roychowdhury shows that this sales management has the ability to lead to better overall 
sales numbers and total profits. In turn, this would positively benefit a firm’s equity price. 
However, in this analysis, cash flows from operations are analyzed per management’s 
reporting on the financial statements. This leads to numerous ways cash flow 
management can affect underlying equity price. In order to do this, executives can 
actively manipulate cash flows from operations in ways that differ from sales 
management. Instead of reducing cash flows from operations as an equity price-boosting 
tactic, managers can largely increase cash flows from operations to pad their bottom line 
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numbers. This could be done by revenue manipulation, such as capitalizing normal 
operating expenditures, misclassifying inventory purchases, or creating accounting 
rollups through serial acquisitions. All of these strategies would move equity price in the 
executives’ favor. This type of cash flow from operations manipulation is consistent with, 
and is evidenced by, the observed results.  
 This line of thinking is furthered by the results evidenced in equation 3 regarding 
abnormal cash flows from operations. Table 6 Panel J presents the results in the case of 
smallsurprise1 and a 10b5-1 plan sale. In this analysis, the coefficients for abnormal cash 
flows from operations and dummysales are both positive and statistically significant 
below the 1% level. These positive and highly significant coefficients indicate that the 
occurrence of a sale increases the likelihood of a small earnings surprise in the previous 
quarter by 10.3%. Additionally, a 0.5% increase the level of abnormal cash flows from 
operations increases the likelihood of a small earnings surprise by 55.2%. This increase 
in abnormal cash flows from operations ahead of a sale was shown to be likely to occur 
in equation 2 (Table 5 Panel B). In the case of an equity purchase, the coefficients for 
abnormal cash flows from operations and dummypurchases are significant below the 1% 
level. The coefficient on dummypurchases is negative, indicating that a 10b5-1 purchase 
decreases the likelihood of a small earnings surprise in the previous quarter by 5.5%. A 
0.5% decrease in the level of abnormal cash flows from operations decreases the changes 
of a small earnings surprise in the preceding quarter by 56.9%. Equation 2 shows that this 
manipulation is likely to occur. These results show that although Roychowdhury asserts 
lower cash flows from operations may influence COGS, thus padding the bottom line, 
massively higher cash flows from operations would also clearly positively affect equity 
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price. This indicates that executives are largely manipulating cash flows from operations, 
potentially through financial statement reclassification or revenue timing, in order to 
positively influence their potential equity trade returns. These results hold true for the 
occurrence of smallsurprise2 and smallsurprise3, and remain significant at the 1% level. 
 The results from equation 2 (Table 5 Panel C) and equation 3 (Table 6 Panels K1-
K3) are contrary to expectation in the case of abnormal production. The equation 2 
coefficient on dummysales is negative and statistically significant below the 1% level. 
This suggests that ahead of equity sales, managers manipulate abnormal production 
downwards by 0.46% of assets. The coefficient on dummypurchases is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, indicting that managers manipulate abnormal 
production upwards by 0.24% of firm assets in advance of an equity purchase. The signs 
on these coefficients are contrary to expectation, suggesting that management is not using 
abnormal production levels to manipulate earnings in the manner initially expected 
according to Roychowdhury (2006). These results do, however, indicate that abnormal 
production is influenced by 10b5-1 plan transactions. This implies that abnormal 
production may be used as a means for other manipulation opposite of what 
Roychowdhury has expected. The result from equation 3 (Table 6 Panel K) furthers this 
assumption. In the case of a 10b5-1 sale, the coefficient for abnormal production is 
negative and statistically significant below the 1% level. The coefficient on dummysales 
is positive and statistically significant below the 1% level. This indicates that lower 
abnormal production levels in amount of 0.5% of firm assets contribute to a 22.9% higher 
likelihood of a small earnings surprise in the previous quarter. This indicates that 
abnormal production increases reduce the likelihood of a small earnings surprise. The 
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same intuition holds true in the case of a 10b5-1 purchase. The coefficient for abnormal 
production remains negative and statistically significant below the 1% level, confirming 
that 0.5% increases in abnormal production decrease the likelihood of a small earnings 
surprise by 22.2%. These results hold true for the occurrence of smallsurprise2 and 
smallsurprise3, and remain significant at the 1% level. This observed result and intuition 
is contrary to Roychowdhury (2006). This could be due to the inherent differences 
between studies. Roychowdhury examines the overall effect of abnormal production 
manipulation on earnings levels, while this study only examines the effect of said 
manipulation on a small earnings surprise. Furthermore, Roychowdhury’s abnormal 
production model may not accurately capture how abnormal production affects the 
likelihood of a small earnings surprise. This is a relationship that requires additional 
study.  
 The results from equation 2 (Table 5 Panel D) and equation 3 (Table 6 Panels L1-
L3) are contrary to expectation in the case of abnormal performance matched accruals. 
Equation 2 results indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
abnormal performance matched accruals and the occurrence of a 10b5-1 plan purchase. 
In regards to a 10b5-1 plan sale, the coefficient on abnormal performance matched 
accruals is negative and statistically significant below the 1% level. This sign is opposite 
of expectations. Ahead of a 10b5-1 sale, expectations were that abnormal performance 
match accruals would be managed upward in order to create a high equity price. This is 
not the case. The fact that accruals are being significantly managed downward by 0.43% 
of assets ahead of a 10b5-1 equity sale indicates that accruals are not the active account 
being manipulated by executives ahead of their own insider trades. This intuition is 
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corroborated by the results from equation 3 (Table 6 Panels L1-L3). In both the case of a 
10b5-1 sale or a 10b5-1 purchase, the coefficient on PMabnormalaccruals is positive and 
statistically insignificant. This indicates that the level of abnormal performance matched 
accruals does not play a role in the likelihood of a small earnings surprise in the previous 
quarter. Due to the fact that accrual management is so highly scrutinized in today’s 
environment, executives may prefer to manipulate earnings through an account that is 
less scrutinized. It would follow that earnings management should be achieved through 
other methods, such as abnormal discretionary expenditure management and abnormal 
cash flows from operations. 
 The results have shown that high-level executives do manipulate earnings ahead 
of their own 10b5-1 transactions. Specifically, insiders manage abnormal discretionary 
expenditures and abnormal cash flows from operations to move equity prices in their 
favor before their own sales and purchases. Additionally, insiders prefer to manipulate 
earnings through these identified real activities, as opposed to through accruals, which are 
more heavily scrutinized. Lastly, the results indicate that abnormal production is not 
being manipulated in the fashion originally presumed. Abnormal production may be used 
as an earnings manipulation tactic, but only if Roychowdhury’s model does not 
accurately capture how production is used to manipulate earnings.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), in response to its longstanding 
concern with insider trading, created a special set of restrictions to be followed under 
Rule 10b5-1 that allows insiders to trade equity for firms in which they possess material 
nonpublic information about. The climate surrounding 10b5-1 plans and their use is 
shifting increasingly negative. Prior research has shown that participants in 10b5-1 plan 
transactions generate abnormally above average returns on said trades (see for example 
Jagolinzer (2008)). Additionally, prior research has shown that firms whose high-level 
executives participate in 10b5-1 equity transactions meet or beat analyst earnings 
expectations at a greater frequency than firms whose insiders do not execute 10b5-1 
equity transactions (see for example Shon and Veliotis (2013)).    
This analysis contributes to existing literature by examining the means by which 
participants in 10b5-1 plan trades generate abnormal trade returns and meet or beat 
analyst expectations. I further examine how firms are likely to achieve such results, i.e., 
through the manipulation of discretionary expenditures and/or cash flows from 
operations. Finally, I examine whether these earnings manipulations increase the 
likelihood of the firm exhibiting a small earnings surprise. 
 The results of this study provide suggestive evidence that executives engage in 
earnings manipulation ahead of their own 10b5-1 plan trades. The analysis further 
suggests that executives appear to manipulate discretionary expenditures and cash flows 
from operations in an attempt to generate better personal trade returns. While I also find 
suggestive evidence that high-level executives may potentially manage earnings through 
the manipulation of abnormal production, this assertion requires further research 
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regarding modeling techniques for the effect of abnormal production on small earnings 
surprises. There is also evidence to suggest that executives are likely to avoid 
manipulating a financial account that already receives heightened scrutiny, such as 
accruals. Moreover, they appear to be more likely to conduct manipulation through a 
means not often discussed by regulators, such as through discretionary expenditures or 
cash flows from operations.  
 These findings may be particularly relevant to government regulators, who are 
tasked with maintaining the integrity of Rule 10b5 and Rule 10b5-1. The SEC routinely 
refers to the participation in a 10b5-1 plan as a “defense” mechanism.9 However, a 
mechanism that allows for participants to generate above average returns, to have their 
own firm’s equity routinely benefit from meeting or beating analyst expectations, and to 
have participants who manipulate their own firm’s financial accounts ahead of their own 
trades, seems more offensive than defensive and against the SEC’s original intentions. 
Managing discretionary expenditures and cash flows from operations is not inherently in 
violation of any rules. However, when these manipulations take place in the quarter 
preceding an executive’s own 10b5-1 equity trades, and these manipulations have been 
shown to actively assist in the occurrence of small earnings surprises, it is due further 
attention and discussion. 
 
 
                                                
9 See SEC Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION. 17 CFR Parts 240, 243, and 249. Release Nos. 33-7881, 
34-43154, IC-24599, File No. S7-31-99. RIN 3235-AH82. Selective Disclosure and 
Insider Trading 
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Table 1 List of Variable Definitions 
Abnormalcfo Abnormal cash flows from operations. The level of firm cash 
flows from operations that are above the industry average, 
controlling for factors that influence cash flows from 
operations to fluctuate. 
Abnormaldisc Abnormal discretionary expenditures. The level of firm 
discretionary expenditures that are above the industry average, 
controlling for factors that influence discretionary 
expenditures to fluctuate. 
Abnormalaccruals Abnormal performance matched accruals. The level of firm 
accruals that are above the industry average, controlling for 
factors that influence accrual manipulation. 
Abnormalprod Abnormal production- the level of firm production that is 
above the industry average, controlling for factors that 
influence production to fluctuate. 
Change in sales 
over assets 
The percentage change in a firm’s sales from one quarter to 
the next, divided by the percentage change in a firm’s assets 
over the same time frame.  
Debtoverassets The firm’s entire value of debt (both short and long term) 
divided by the firm’s entire value of assets. This variable is a 
proxy for leverage and closeness to violating debt covenants. 
Dummypurchases A binary variable equal to 1 if there was a 10b5-1 purchase by 
a high-level executive in the given quarter. Equal to 0 if a 
10b5-1 purchase did not occur. 
Dummysales A binary variable equal to 1 if there was a 10b5-1 sale by a 
high-level executive in the given quarter. Equal to 0 if a 10b5-
1 sale did not occur. 
Equity purchase The purchase of a firm’s common stock shares by an insider 
of that firm. 
Equity sale The sale of a firm’s common stock shares by an insider of that 
firm. 
Excessreturn The compounded three-month return percentage of a firm’s 
equity out (under) performance over the S&P500 index. 
 
Inside 
information 
Any information regarding a firm that may be relevant to its 
current market standing that is not known by the general 
trading public. 
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*Note that whether or not a variable has ‘w01’ as a prefix as listed in tables, it has been 
winsorized at the .01 level. 
 
 
 
 
Insider One who possesses material nonpublic information regarding 
a firm. 
Insider trade A trade made by someone who possesses material nonpublic 
information regarding the firm whose equity was traded upon. 
 
Inverse of assets The reciprocal (1/assets) of a firm’s asset level, as denoted by 
the financial statements.  
 
Logmarketcap The logarithmic function of the total dollar market value of a 
firm’s total number of outstanding shares. 
Markettobook The ratio of the firm’s total market capitalization divided by 
the firm’s total book value. This variable represents how the 
market perceives equity to be fairly valued.  
Property plan and 
equipment (PPE) 
The level of property, plan, and equipment owned by a firm, 
as denoted by the financial statements. 
Sales over assets The level of a firm’s sales divided by that firm’s total assets. 
Shareturnover The volume of a firm’s shares traded per day divided by the 
firm’s total outstanding float. This variable is a proxy for firm 
share liquidity. Denoted salesshareturnover in sales 
regressions, purchasesshareturnover in purchases regressions. 
Summary statistics are for all total equities share turnover. 
Sic2 Standard Industrial Classification code at the two-digit level. 
Smallsurprise1 A binary variable that equals 1 if a firm’s quarterly earnings 
per share reporting beat analyst expectations by greater than 
0.0 cents but less than 0.5 cents. 
Smallsurprise2 A binary variable that equals 1 if a firm’s quarterly earnings 
per share reporting beat analyst expectations by greater than 
0.5 cents but less than 1.0 cents. 
Smallsurprise3 A binary variable that equals 1 if a firm’s quarterly earnings 
per share reporting beat analyst expectations by greater than 
1.0 cents but less than 1.5 cents. 
Spreturn The month over month return of the S&P500 index. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable
n
m
ean
sd
m
ax
m
in
sk
5%
25%
50%
75%
95%
A
bnorm
aldisc
45086
0.0015
0.037
0.149
-0.080
1.262
-0.051
-0.017
-0.001
0.012
0.075
A
bnorm
alcfo
53809
0.0004
0.036
0.102
-0.130
-0.587
-0.062
-0.013
0.001
0.017
0.057
A
bnorm
alprod
48661
-0.0017
0.047
0.169
-0.138
0.456
-0.078
-0.022
-0.002
0.017
0.078
A
bnorm
alPM
accruals
53809
-0.0002
0.038
0.118
-0.166
-0.900
-0.060
-0.013
0.001
0.016
0.055
Sm
allsurprise1
53425
0.473
0.499
1
0
0.107
0
0
0
1
1
Sm
allsurprise2
53425
0.553
0.497
1
0
-0.214
0
0
1
1
1
Sm
allsurprise3
53425
0.585
0.493
1
0
-0.343
0
0
1
1
1
dum
m
ysales
53809
0.180
0.384
1
0
1.664
0
0
0
0
1
dum
m
ypurchases
53809
0.062
0.242
1
0
3.621
0
0
0
0
1
vix
53809
23.8
9.0
44.1
13.5
1.0
13.7
16.9
21.7
26.4
43.0
spreturn
53809
0.0032
0.05
0.09
-0.09
-0.47
-0.09
-0.02
0.01
0.03
0.09
debtoverassets
51481
260.14
1013.79
8039.92
0.00
6.18
0.00
0.18
5.45
66.98
1125.49
salesshareturnover
53800
1.91
1.77
10.33
0.08
2.28
0.22
0.77
1.41
2.40
5.37
purchasesshareturnover
53800
1.91
1.77
10.33
0.08
2.28
0.22
0.77
1.41
2.40
5.37
logm
arketcap
53795
13.55
1.79
18.06
9.70
0.20
10.69
12.27
13.47
14.75
0.20
excessreturn
53766
0.011
0.22
0.88
-0.51
0.90
-0.32
-0.11
-0.01
0.11
0.90
m
arkettobook
53794
1216.16
1365.32
7827.30
19.91
2.48
75.28
367.05
787.43
1518.95
3976.59
Table 2 D
escriptive Statistics
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Table 3: Correlations         
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlations continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abnormaldisc Abnormalcfo Abnormalprod abnormalaccruals Smallsurprise1 Smallsurprise2 Smallsurprise3 dummysales dummypurchases
Abnormaldisc 1
Abnormalcfo -0.172 1
Abnormalprod -0.588 -0.306 1
AbnormalPMaccruals -0.108 -0.433 0.067 1
Smallsurprise1 -0.034 0.134 -0.066 0.038 1
Smallsurprise2 -0.027 0.133 -0.070 0.039 0.849 1
Smallsurprise3 -0.025 0.134 -0.070 0.039 0.798 0.939 1
dummysales 0.042 0.083 -0.068 -0.020 0.172 0.164 0.157 1
dummypurchases 0.013 -0.041 0.022 -0.012 -0.075 -0.074 -0.070 -0.122 1
vix -0.005 0.008 -0.007 0.009 -0.075 -0.064 -0.058 -0.064 0.083
spreturn 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.038 -0.094
debtoverassets -0.057 0.034 0.009 0.014 0.043 0.036 0.031 -0.023 -0.019
salesshareturnover 0.031 0.021 -0.040 -0.027 0.011 0.020 0.024 0.079 -0.028
purchasesshareturnover 0.031 0.021 -0.040 -0.027 0.011 0.020 0.024 0.079 -0.028
logmarketcap -0.142 0.195 -0.034 0.041 0.322 0.286 0.259 0.198 -0.013
excessreturn 0.010 0.052 -0.031 0.024 0.070 0.083 0.090 0.086 -0.064
markettobook 0.281 0.087 -0.313 -0.018 0.195 0.161 0.144 0.212 -0.078
Table 3 Correlations
vix spreturn debtoverassets salesshareturnover purchasesshareturnover logmarketcap excessreturn markettobook
Abnormaldisc
Abnormalcfo
Abnormalprod
AbnormalPMaccruals
Smallsurprise1
Smallsurprise2
Smallsurprise3
dummysales
dummypurchases
vix 1
spreturn -0.567 1
debtoverassets -0.003 -0.003 1
salesshareturnover 0.123 -0.095 0.037 1
purchasesshareturnover 0.123 -0.095 0.037 1.000 1
logmarketcap -0.124 0.029 0.359 0.262 0.262 1
excessreturn -0.050 0.034 -0.002 0.060 0.060 0.094 1
markettobook -0.114 0.043 -0.112 0.095 0.095 0.190 0.127 1
Table 3 Correlations
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Table 4: Pairwise / Pearson Correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Pairwise / Pearson Correlations continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abnormaldisc Abnormalcfo Abnormalprod abnormalaccruals Smallsurprise1 Smallsurprise2 Smallsurprise3 dummysales dummypurchases
Abnormaldisc 1
Abnormalcfo -0.175 1
Abnormalprod -0.586 -0.356 1
AbnormalPMaccruals -0.121 -0.429 0.029 1
Smallsurprise1 -0.033 0.137 -0.093 0.032 1
Smallsurprise2 -0.028 0.134 -0.093 0.039 0.852 1
Smallsurprise3 -0.026 0.132 -0.090 0.040 0.799 0.938 1
dummysales 0.041 0.082 -0.074 -0.019 0.168 0.159 0.151 1
dummypurchases 0.011 -0.044 0.027 -0.005 -0.073 -0.074 -0.070 -0.121 1
vix -0.005 0.012 -0.010 0.008 -0.066 -0.058 -0.052 -0.056 0.071
spreturn 0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.004 0.020 0.022 0.021 0.038 -0.092
debtoverassets -0.055 0.026 -0.004 0.017 0.023 0.014 0.011 -0.028 -0.007
salesshareturnover 0.035 0.012 -0.027 -0.033 0.005 0.010 0.012 0.067 -0.018
purchasesshareturnover 0.035 0.012 -0.027 -0.033 0.005 0.010 0.012 0.067 -0.018
logmarketcap -0.136 0.188 -0.076 0.036 0.311 0.274 0.247 0.193 -0.126
excessreturn 0.009 0.048 -0.025 0.002 0.073 0.081 0.087 0.087 -0.058
markettobook 0.283 0.015 -0.136 -0.031 0.151 0.125 0.111 0.185 -0.065
Numbers in bold are significant at 5% level
Table 4 Pairwise / Pearson Correlation
vix spreturn debtoverassets salesshareturnover purchasesshareturnover logmarketcap excessreturn markettobook
Abnormaldisc
Abnormalcfo
Abnormalprod
AbnormalPMaccruals
Smallsurprise1
Smallsurprise2
Smallsurprise3
dummysales
dummypurchases
vix 1
spreturn -0.523 1
debtoverassets -0.008 -0.002 1
salesshareturnover 0.110 -0.099 0.065 1
purchasesshareturnover 0.110 -0.099 0.065 1.000 1
logmarketcap -0.111 0.030 0.350 0.232 0.232 1
excessreturn -0.037 0.030 -0.013 0.068 0.068 0.105 1
markettobook -0.109 0.039 -0.134 0.096 0.096 0.124 0.144 1
Numbers in bold are significant at 5% level
Table 4 Pairwise / Pearson Correlation
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Table 5: Model 2 Regression of Earnings Management on Insider Transactions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables
Purchases
Sales
Purchases
Sales
Purchases
Sales
Purchases
Sales
dum
m
ypurchases
0.00136
-0.00329***
0.00241**
0.000833
1.432
-3.749
1.990
0.852
dum
m
ysales
-0.00175*
0.00420***
-0.00463***
-0.00428***
-1.920
6.968
-4.660
-7.148
w
01vix
2.69e-05
7.74e-05
-8.27e-05
-8.13e-05
-0.000220*
-0.000220*
8.45e-05
8.55e-05
0.353
1.018
-0.906
-0.893
-1.885
-1.886
0.674
0.683
w
01spreturn
-0.00345
-0.00359
0.00485
0.00486
-0.0127
-0.0124
-0.0145
-0.0143
-0.373
-0.386
0.531
0.534
-1.086
-1.059
-1.106
-1.093
w
01debtoverassets
2.29e-06***
-1.40e-06***
-1.70e-06***
-1.60e-06***
1.25e-07
1.21e-08
9.64e-07***
8.55e-07***
6.215
-4.538
-5.704
-5.410
0.260
0.0253
4.731
4.224
w
01purchasesshareturnover
0.00137***
-0.000869***
6.97e-05
-0.000585***
5.314
-4.621
0.239
-3.587
w
01salesshareturnover
0.000305
-0.000893***
9.70e-05
-0.000562***
1.158
-4.756
0.334
-3.455
w
01logm
arketcap
-0.00501***
0.00464***
0.00451***
-0.00170***
-0.00153***
-0.00109***
-0.000913***
-13.73
18.85
18.45
-3.951
-3.612
-6.000
-5.116
w
01excessreturn
-0.00338***
-0.00628***
0.00470***
0.00457***
0.000323
0.000527
-0.00296**
-0.00272**
-3.638
-6.635
5.154
5.030
0.262
0.428
-2.459
-2.264
w
01m
arkettobook
1.12e-05***
1.02e-05***
-4.23e-07
-5.72e-07
-5.60e-06***
-5.43e-06***
6.13e-08
2.25e-07
16.60
15.15
-0.914
-1.227
-6.926
-6.656
0.194
0.712
C
onstant
0.0527***
-0.0113**
-0.0633***
-0.0624***
0.0292**
0.0279**
0.00854
0.00697
6.751
-2.420
-3.968
-3.863
2.409
2.263
0.417
0.338
O
bservations
43,571
43,571
51,439
51,439
46,588
46,588
51,439
51,439
R
-squared
0.140
0.099
0.047
0.048
0.028
0.029
0.004
0.006
Tim
e period dum
m
ies?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry dum
m
ies?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Panel A
 - abnorm
aldisc
Panel B
- abnorm
alcfo
Panel D
- abnorm
alaccruals
Panel C
- abnorm
alprod
Table 5 R
egression of Earnings M
anagem
ent on Insider Transactions
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Table 6.1: Model 3 Panel H Regression of Small Earnings Surprise on Insider 
Transactions and Earnings Management - Abnormaldisc focus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables
Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases
w01abnormaldisc -0.353*** -0.276** -0.183 -0.113 -0.114 -0.0743
-2.891 -2.290 -1.625 -1.015 -1.063 -0.698
dummysales 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.109***
12.74 13.53 13.95
dummysalesiadisc 0.174 0.201 0.0908
0.892 1.015 0.478
dummypurchases -0.0579*** -0.0631*** -0.0579***
-4.615 -5.254 -4.951
dummypurchasesiadisc -0.301 -0.163 -0.0327
-0.877 -0.530 -0.108
w01vix 0.00159 0.00159 0.000578 0.000586 0.00128 0.00129
1.255 1.257 0.458 0.465 1.026 1.035
w01spreturn 0.0529 0.0552 -0.0194 -0.0160 -0.0661 -0.0618
0.371 0.389 -0.145 -0.120 -0.510 -0.479
w01salesshareturnover -0.0229*** -0.0165*** -0.0137***
-9.439 -7.555 -6.644
w01purchasesshareturnover -0.0221*** -0.0157*** -0.0129***
-9.134 -7.221 -6.299
w01logmarketcap 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.0974*** 0.101*** 0.0856*** 0.0892***
40.48 41.50 36.67 37.75 33.62 34.81
w01debtoverassets -4.11e-05*** -4.39e-05*** -3.55e-05*** -3.85e-05*** -3.20e-05*** -3.50e-05***
-7.877 -8.476 -7.812 -8.555 -7.355 -8.139
w01excessreturn 0.0631*** 0.0685*** 0.0928*** 0.0976*** 0.114*** 0.119***
5.305 5.751 8.031 8.420 9.938 10.33
w01markettobook 4.98e-05*** 5.41e-05*** 3.13e-05*** 3.57e-05*** 2.30e-05*** 2.75e-05***
11.91 12.72 7.931 8.945 6.130 7.220
Psuedo R2 0.1381 0.1346 0.1133 0.1095 0.1006 0.0965
Walden Chi2(87) 3678.15 3428.12 3236.32 3025.27 3002.11 2806.03
Prob > Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 43,128 43,128 43,128 43,128 43,128 43,128
Time period dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel H1: Smallsurprise1 Panel H2: Smallsurprise2 Panel H3: Smallsurprise3
Table 6 Panel H Regression of Small Earnings Surprise on Insider Transactions and Earnings Management - Abnormaldisc focus
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Table 6.2: Model 3 Panel J Regression of Small Earnings Surprise on Insider 
Transactions and Earnings Management - Abnormalcfo focus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables
Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases
w01abnormalcfo 1.105*** 1.137*** 1.191*** 1.222*** 1.235*** 1.269***
11.15 11.37 12.68 12.92 13.76 14.03
dummysales 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.105***
12.33 13.07 13.44
dummysalesiadisc -0.0418 0.147 0.105
-0.222 0.777 0.577
dummypurchases -0.0553*** -0.0607*** -0.0557***
-4.430 -5.088 -4.785
dummypurchasesiadisc -0.320 -0.0159 0.163
-0.939 -0.0526 0.546
w01vix 0.00166 0.00166 0.000636 0.000653 0.00135 0.00137
1.308 1.310 0.504 0.518 1.079 1.096
w01spreturn 0.0491 0.0526 -0.0215 -0.0173 -0.0701 -0.0654
0.343 0.369 -0.160 -0.129 -0.536 -0.502
w01salesshareturnover -0.0226*** -0.0158*** -0.0129***
-9.406 -7.329 -6.296
w01purchasesshareturnover -0.0218*** -0.0150*** -0.0120***
-9.121 -6.976 -5.931
w01logmarketcap 0.112*** 0.115*** 0.0939*** 0.0969*** 0.0815*** 0.0847***
39.82 40.81 35.61 36.63 32.33 33.48
w01debtoverassets -4.03e-05*** -4.29e-05*** -3.43e-05*** -3.70e-05*** -3.06e-05*** -3.33e-05***
-7.835 -8.399 -7.613 -8.300 -7.073 -7.805
w01excessreturn 0.0606*** 0.0657*** 0.0892*** 0.0936*** 0.110*** 0.115***
5.080 5.499 7.720 8.079 9.584 9.951
w01markettobook 4.60e-05*** 5.02e-05*** 2.90e-05*** 3.38e-05*** 2.13e-05*** 2.60e-05***
11.57 12.52 7.676 8.928 5.921 7.188
Psuedo R2 0.1411 0.1379 0.1174 0.1139 0.1053 0.1015
Walden Chi2(87) 3789.88 3539.14 3356.58 3139.39 3140.56 2942.07
Prob > Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 43,128 43,128 43,128 43,128 43,128 43,128
Time period dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6 Model 3 Panel J Regression of Small Earnings Surprise on Insider Transactions and Earnings Management - Abnormalcfo focus
Panel J1: Smallsurprise1 Panel J2: Smallsurprise2 Panel J3: Smallsurprise3
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Table 6.3: Model 3 Panel K Regression of Small Earnings Surprise on Insider 
Transactions and Earnings Management - Abnormalprod focus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables
Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases
w01abnormalprod -0.458*** -0.443*** -0.615*** -0.610*** -0.683*** -0.665***
-4.971 -4.822 -7.314 -7.264 -8.551 -8.343
dummysales 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.107***
11.93 12.77 13.23
dummysalesiadisc -0.408** -0.303 -0.401**
-2.069 -1.526 -2.108
dummypurchases -0.0534*** -0.0551*** -0.0496***
-3.983 -4.348 -4.017
dummypurchasesiadisc -0.731** -0.590* -0.414
-2.059 -1.863 -1.317
w01vix 0.00126 0.00125 0.000325 0.000335 0.00104 0.00105
0.962 0.957 0.249 0.257 0.807 0.819
w01spreturn 0.00959 0.0199 -0.0598 -0.0496 -0.0890 -0.0780
0.0620 0.129 -0.406 -0.338 -0.618 -0.543
w01salesshareturnover -0.0246*** -0.0179*** -0.0145***
-9.675 -7.820 -6.705
w01purchasesshareturnover -0.0239*** -0.0172*** -0.0139***
-9.454 -7.557 -6.453
w01logmarketcap 0.116*** 0.120*** 0.0984*** 0.102*** 0.0863*** 0.0901***
39.85 40.95 35.83 37.00 32.79 34.09
w01debtoverassets -4.14e-05*** -4.42e-05*** -3.51e-05*** -3.80e-05*** -3.12e-05*** -3.43e-05***
-7.768 -8.363 -7.145 -7.861 -6.629 -7.392
w01excessreturn 0.0612*** 0.0669*** 0.0927*** 0.0980*** 0.113*** 0.119***
4.846 5.286 7.606 8.013 9.289 9.715
w01markettobook 4.25e-05*** 4.60e-05*** 2.31e-05*** 2.72e-05*** 1.44e-05*** 1.82e-05***
9.993 10.68 5.758 6.694 3.770 4.727
Pseudo R2 0.1382 0.1349 0.1141 0.1104 0.1019 0.0978
Walden Chi2(87) 3457.72 3237.4 3022.64 2832.52 2793.93 2605.65
Prob > Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 39,295 39,295 39,295 39,295 39,295 39,295
Time period dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6 Panel K Regression of Small Earnings Surprise on Insider Transactions and Earnings Management - Abnormalprod focus
Panel K1: Smallsurprise1 Panel K2: Smallsurprise2 Panel K3: Smallsurprise3
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Table 6.4: Model 3 Panel L Regression of Small Earnings Surprise on Insider 
Transactions and Earnings Management - Abnormalaccruals focus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables
Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases
w01PMabnormalaccruals 0.0458 0.0169 -0.00483 -0.0362 -0.0113 -0.0416
0.770 0.284 -0.0830 -0.618 -0.198 -0.729
dummysales 0.107*** 0.109*** 0.109***
12.81 13.57 13.98
dummysalesiadisc -0.129 0.0410 -0.00947
-0.674 0.214 -0.0513
dummypurchases -0.0575*** -0.0629*** -0.0578***
-4.581 -5.238 -4.940
dummypurchasesiadisc -0.539 -0.261 -0.0978
-1.602 -0.865 -0.331
w01vix 0.00159 0.00158 0.000578 0.000587 0.00128 0.00129
1.251 1.247 0.458 0.466 1.027 1.038
w01spreturn 0.0531 0.0560 -0.0194 -0.0161 -0.0662 -0.0622
0.373 0.395 -0.145 -0.121 -0.511 -0.481
w01salesshareturnover -0.0232*** -0.0167*** -0.0139***
-9.547 -7.628 -6.703
w01purchasesshareturnover -0.0225*** -0.0159*** -0.0131***
-9.278 -7.302 -6.368
w01logmarketcap 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.0982*** 0.101*** 0.0861*** 0.0896***
41.14 42.12 37.16 38.19 34.06 35.21
w01debtoverassets -4.18e-05*** -4.45e-05*** -3.59e-05*** -3.87e-05*** -3.22e-05*** -3.51e-05***
-8.010 -8.591 -7.895 -8.611 -7.409 -8.176
w01excessreturn 0.0642*** 0.0696*** 0.0933*** 0.0980*** 0.115*** 0.120***
5.403 5.847 8.090 8.470 9.984 10.37
w01markettobook 4.67e-05*** 5.10e-05*** 2.96e-05*** 3.45e-05*** 2.20e-05*** 2.66e-05***
11.54 12.43 7.726 8.909 6.028 7.227
Pseudo R2 0.1378 0.1344 0.1132 0.1095 0.1006 0.0965
Walden Chi2(87) 3688.02 3434.79 3236.91 3023.02 3002.12 2805.18
Prob > Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 43,128 43,128 43,128 43,128 43,128 43,128
Time period dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6 Panel L Regression of Small Earnings Surprise on Insider Transactions and Earnings Management - Abnormalaccruals focus
Panel L1: Smallsurprise1 Panel L2: Smallsurprise2 Panel L3: Smallsurprise3
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Table 7 Differences in Means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Sale No Sale Difference t
Abnormaldisc 0.0047 0.0007 0.0040 4.0
Abnormalcfo 0.0066 -0.0010 0.0076 12.7
Abnormalprod -0.0090 -0.0001 -0.0089 -8.8
Abnormalaccruals -0.0063 -0.0011 -0.0051 -9.1
Variable Purchase No Purchase Difference t
Abnormaldisc 0.0030 0.0014 0.0017 1.6
Abnormalcfo -0.0057 0.0008 -0.0065 -7.5
Abnormalprod 0.0032 -0.0021 0.0053 4.6
AbnormalPMaccruals -0.0003 -0.0022 0.0019 2.0
